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NOTE
WHITNER v. STATE: ABERRATIONAL
JUDICIAL RESPONSE OR WAVE OF THE
FUTURE FOR MATERNAL SUBSTANCE
ABUSE CASES?
I. INTRODUCTION
If a woman can be prosecuted for drinking while pregnant-
which, by the way, is not illegal-could another be prosecuted
for smoking cigarettes and birthing an underweight baby? For
endangering her unborn child by failing to heed a doctor's bed
rest orders? For becoming pregnant while obese, thus doubling,
or in the case of the extremely obese even quadrupling, the
chance of neural tube defects?1
Prosecutors criminally charged over 200 women in 30 states with drug
use or other actions, such as consuming alcohol, that endangered their
fetuses during pregnancy.2 Most prosecutors brought these criminal
charges under existing drug delivery and distribution statutes, as well as
child abuse and endangerment statutes.3 States have resorted to these
punitive actions in a frustrated attempt to deal with a rapidly growing
problem that appears to have no solution: substance abuse by pregnant
women, resulting in a baby born addicted to, or impaired by, drugs and/or
alcohol. While no one can deny the gravity of the problem, is criminal
prosecution a legally permissible, and socially responsible, solution?
It is estimated that anywhere from 40,000 to 375,000 drug-exposed ba-
bies are born each year.4 These numbers may be seriously underesti-
1. Robin Abcarian, A New Strategy for Pregnancy Police?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18,
1996, at E2.
2. Punishing Women for their Behavior During Pregnancy, REPROD. FREEDOM IN
Focus (Center for Reprod. Law & Pol'y, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 14,1996, at 2 [hereinafter
Punishing].
3. Id.
4. Alcohol and Other Drug-Related Birth Defects, NCADD FACT SHEET (Nat'l
Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1994, at 2
(these numbers include maternal use of only illegal drugs, and would be greater if they
reflected alcohol and nicotine as well) [hereinafter Alcohol].
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mated due both to the lack of systematic hospital procedures that identify
these infants and the imperfect methods of substance detection.5 For ex-
ample, urine analysis can detect drug ingestion by the mother that oc-
curred only within the past twenty-four to seventy-two hours.6 The
effects of maternal drug use on a fetus can be devastating. Although the
long-term effects of cocaine on children exposed in utero are not firmly
established, findings show obstetrical complications, low birth weight,
smaller head circumference, abnormal neonatal behavior, and cerebral
infarction at birth may result.7 As they grow, these children are easily
distracted, exhibit passive behavior, experience a myriad of visual-per-
ception problems, and encounter difficulties with fine motor skills.8
Alcohol abuse by a pregnant woman can be just as devastating to the
fetus as cocaine, heroin, or other illicit drug use.9 Fetal alcohol syndrome
("FAS") is a major cause of mental retardation,1 ° and has been linked to
such congenital birth defects as prenatal and postnatal growth deficiency,
small head circumference, flattened midface, sunken nasal bridge, and
flattened and elongated philtrum.11 Central nervous system dysfunction
and varying degrees of major organ system malformations also have been
observed in FAS babies.12 As they get older, children with FAS experi-
ence problems with learning, attention, memory, problem solving, physi-
cal coordination, impulsiveness, hearing, and speech. 3
An FAS rate of 3.7 per 10,000 births has been reported, but these num-
bers may be low. 4 Making an FAS diagnosis at birth is difficult because
the facial characteristics of newborns are hard to discern, and behavioral
and cognitive functioning problems are not observable until the child is
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION BOARD OF TRUSTEES REPORT, Legal Interven-
tions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatment and Legal Penalties for Poten-
tially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2666-667 (1990)
[hereinafter AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION].
10. Alcohol, supra note 4, at 1 (fetal alcohol syndrome ("FAS") can be prevented by
abstaining from alcohol consumption during pregnancy).
11. Id. "Philtrum" is the vertical furrow between the nose and upper lip. Francis Fla-
herty, Odds and Ends, THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 1993, at 41.
12. Alcohol, supra note 4, at 1.
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id. at 1. Many babies also suffer from fetal alcohol effects ("FAE"), which in-
cludes the same basic symptoms of FAS, but with less severity. Characteristics include low
birth weight, subtle behavior problems, or a partial display of the FAS physical malforma-
tions. Id.
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older.15
Children born impaired by drugs or alcohol impose both short- and
long-term costs on' society, not all of which are strictly financial in nature.
Hospital stays of newborns who are exposed, prenatally, to drugs and/or
alcohol are on average three times longer than the stays of newborns of
non-substance-abusing mothers.'6 The total annual cost of treating birth
defects caused by FAS was estimated at $1.6 billion in 1985.1' A 1995
estimate placed the lifetime cost of caring for one person with FAS at $1.4
million. 8
Drug-exposed and FAS children will require numerous state services to
meet their special medical, educational, and emotional needs.19 As
adults, many of these children will perpetuate the cycle of substance
abuse and dysfunctional behavior that they observed and experienced
when they were young.2 ° Many of the women will abuse substances while
pregnant, just as their own mothers did.2' In addition, many of these
prenatally harmed individuals are likely to engage in criminal activity to
support the drug lifestyles that they have adopted from their parents.22
Almost all experts agree that education and treatment are the ultimate
answers to maternal substance abuse.23 In reality, however, this solution
is neither practical nor readily implemented. Most treatment centers use
traditional treatment methods that are not geared towards the specialized
needs of pregnant women." They also hesitate to accept pregnant wo-
men due to liability concerns. Finally, even if adequate treatment is
15. Id. Fetal alcohol effects is found much more frequently than full-blown FAS.
Whether a baby has FAE or FAS depends on the stage of fetal development in which the
alcohol consumption occurred, biological and environmental variables, and the frequency
and quantity of the mother's alcohol consumption. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2 (for persons over 21 years old, the cost was $1.3 billion, and neonatal
intensive care for growth retardation due to FAS accounted for $118 million).
18. Robert L. Bratton, M.D., Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: How You Can Help Prevent It,
POSTGRADUATE MED., Nov. 1995, at 197.
19. Judy Howard, Substance Use During Pregnancy: Legal and Social Responses:
Chronic Drug Users as Parents, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 648 (1992).
20. Id. at 651.
21.. Id. at 651-52.
22. Id. at 652.
23. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 9, at 2668.
24. Id. at 2669. Most substance abuse treatment centers use an adult male-centered
model, which is not designed to address problems specific to women's psychological or
physiological needs. Consequently, a woman may feel alienated and find her chances for
successful treatment hindered. Id.
25. Id.
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available, many drug and/or alcohol dependent women do not have the
financial resources to pay for these treatment centers.26
Due to the infeasibility of the treatment center option, as well as over-
all frustrations with the complexity of the maternal substance abuse prob-
lem, states have turned to both criminal and civil actions. Until Whitner
v. State,27 all attempts at criminal conviction of a mother for endangering
the life of her child in utero failed.28 Serious constitutional issues regard-
ing the right to privacy, due process, and equal protection arise when
prosecutors charge women under criminal child abuse and endangerment
statutes, or drug delivery and distribution statutes.29
Civil penalties, where women are either placed in protective custody
30
or civilly committed 31 to protect the unborn fetus, or where the state in-
tervenes in a neglect proceeding after the child is born, have been more
successful for the states than the implementation of criminal sanctions.32
Generally, civil penalties are less violative of a woman's constitutional
rights than criminal penalties.
In Whitner, the mother had ingested crack cocaine during the third tri-
mester of her pregnancy, causing her baby to be born with cocaine me-
tabolites in his bloodstream.33 She pleaded guilty to criminal child
26. Ann C. McGinley, Aspirations and Reality in the Law and Politics of Health Care
Reform: Examining a Symposium on (E)qual(ity) Care for the Poor, 60 BROOK. L. Rav. 7,
11-12 (1994).
27. Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *1 (Sup. Ct. S.C. July 15,
1996).
28. See Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Reyes v. Supe-
rior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214 (Ct. App. 1977); Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla.
1992); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864
S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993); State v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (City Ct. 1992); and State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio
1992).
29. Punishing, supra note 2, at 2-3.
30. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1223 (6th ed. 1990) ("[p]rotective custody" is "[t]he
condition of one who is held under authority of law for his own protection as in the case of
a person who because of mental illness or drug addiction may harm himself or
others.").
31. Id. at 245. ("[clivil commitment" is "[a] form of confinement order used in the
civil context for those who are mentally ill, incompetent, alcoholic, drug addicted, etc.").
32. See In re Troy D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889 (Ct. App. 1989); In re Solomon L., 190 Cal.
App. 3d 1106 (Ct. App. 1987); United States v. Vaughn, 117 Daily Washington L. Rep.,
Mar. 7, 1989, at 441 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 1988); In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1980); In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1990); In re
Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Fam.Ct. 1985); and In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. Ct.
1986).
33. Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *3.
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neglect and was sentenced to eight years in prison.34 In upholding
Whitner's conviction, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the
criminal child neglect statute under which she was charged applied to via-
ble fetuses.35
Whitner's conviction represents a major jurisprudential shift towards
upholding the criminal prosecutions of women who ingest drugs while
pregnant. A recent Wisconsin case may extend the Whitner holding to
situations where pregnant women abuse alcohol, a legal substance.36 In
September 1996, Deborah Zimmerman went on a drinking binge shortly
before delivering her baby, who was subsequently born with FAS.3 7 She
was charged with both attempted murder and attempting to cause great
bodily harm.38 If this prosecution is successful, it will mark the first time
that a woman has been criminally convicted for endangering her fetus in
utero while using a legal substance.39
If Whitner and State v. Zimmerman signify a trend towards holding ma-
ternal substance abusers criminally liable, then it might not be long
before new criminal laws specific to prenatal conduct are enacted. Such
laws have been referred to as "fetal abuse statutes," and would create
new crimes with which women could be charged.4" Undoubtedly, such
new laws would make it much easier to convict pregnant alcohol and drug
abusers.
This Note will examine the law as it applies to maternal substance
abuse, and discuss the success of civil and criminal actions in this context.
First, this Note will look at the Whitner case in detail, and examine the
effect the court's holding may have on other states. Second, this Note will
place special emphasis on State v. Zimmerman. Third, this Note will
delve into the real issue behind these cases: the rights of the fetus versus
the rights of the mother. The genesis of both abortion rights and fetal
rights will be discussed, along with the constitutional and policy consider-
ations of both civil and criminal actions. Finally, this Note concludes that
while substance abuse education and treatment are ideal long-term solu-
34. Id.
35. Id. at *2.
36. Edward Walsh, In Case Against Alcoholic Mother, Underlying Issue Is Fetal Rights,
WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1996, at A4.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Telephone Interview with Andrea Miller, Director of Education and Communica-
tions, Center for Reprod. Law & Pol'y in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 24, 1996).
40. Note, Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1519, 1580 (1990).
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tions, they are not presently feasible answers to a problem that requires
immediate attention. Criminalizing maternal substance abuse is simply
not acceptable, due both to the constitutional issues raised and to the
simple fact that these women need treatment, not punishment. The best
short-term solution presently available, therefore, is the existing civil
remedy of the state taking temporary custody of the child after it is born,
with the mother regaining custody once she is able.
II. PRIOR CASE LAW
States have used both civil and criminal statutes to address maternal
substance abuse. Civilly, states have used neglect and abuse statutes after
the child is born, and protective custody and civil commitment orders
while the woman is pregnant. Criminally, women are being charged
under child endangerment, and drug delivery and distribution statutes.
A. Civil Actions
1. Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings Successfully Used
States most frequently use child abuse and neglect statutes because
they are generally the most successful of the various measures aimed at
combatting maternal substance abuse.41 Some states mandate proce-
dures for hospitals to follow in situations when a delivering mother's phy-
sician suspects her of drug or alcohol abuse.4" If drugs and/or alcohol are
found in the newborn's system, then the state asserts temporary custody
of the child.4 3 In more serious cases, the state may attempt to perma-
nently terminate parental rights,44 based on the theory that the mother's
prenatal conduct is probative of future mistreatment of the child.45 For
the state to succeed in these cases, "unborn child" must be included
within the definition of the word "person" or "child" as used in the par-
41. Michelle Oberman, Substance Use During Pregnancy: Legal and Social Responses:
Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of Pregnant Women Who
Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 519 (1992).
42. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, And the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1430 (1991). Such mandatory
reporting procedures are especially common in hospitals that receive public funding. Id. at
1432-33.
43. Punishing, supra note 2, at 5.
44. Marcy Tench Stovall, Looking for a Solution: In re Valerie D. and State Interven-
tion in Prenatal Drug Abuse, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1265, 1284 (1993). When a state assumes
custody of a child, the goal is to reunite the family and termination of parental rights is
viewed as a last resort. Id.
45. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 9, at 2669.
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ticular abuse and neglect statute.46
Although a Michigan court did not rely expressly on a determination
that a fetus is a person, the court found that a fetus could be considered
neglected under the state's child neglect statute. In In re Baby X, a case
where the infant exhibited signs of drug withdrawal twenty-four hours
after birth, the state petitioned the court for temporary custody of the
infant due to the mother's neglect of her child through substance abuse.4 7
The Michigan court examined the issue of whether a mother's prenatal
behavior is relevant to a determination of a newly born child's neglect,48
and concluded that "prenatal treatment can be considered probative of a
child's neglect .... [A] newborn suffering narcotics withdrawal symptoms
as a consequence of prenatal maternal drug addiction may properly be
considered a neglected child.",49 In ruling that temporary custody of the
child was proper, the court made the broad statement, "a child has a legal
right to begin life with a sound mind and body,"5 thus leaving the door
open to the furtherance of fetal rights in Michigan.
Five years after Baby X, the New York court system confronted a simi-
lar situation. In re Smith dealt with an alcoholic mother who gave birth to
a baby exhibiting signs of FAS.5" The court first questioned whether or
not the mother's prenatal abuse of alcohol and refusal to seek treatment,
along with her failure to seek proper medical care during her pregnancy,
constituted neglect.52 The court concluded that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to establish that the mother's prenatal alcohol consumption caused
FAS. However, the court found neglect on the part of the mother, hold-
ing that her behavior contributed to a finding of "imminent danger" to
the unborn child.53
After finding neglect, the court then had to determine whether an un-
46. Punishing, supra note 2, at 2.
47. In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 739.
50. Id. "[Tihe court went on to state however, that it made no determination whether
prenatal drug use by the mother would alone be enough permanently to deprive a parent
of custody." In re Troy D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 899 (Ct. App. 1989).
51. In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (Fam.Ct. 1985).
52. Id. at 333.
53. Id. at 334.
[T]he New York court relied on a rule of law which allows the court to presume
that a child of a person who repeatedly uses alcohol to an extent of impairment of
judgment is a neglected child. The presumption may be rebutted by showing the
fact of enrollment in a recognized rehabilitative program.
In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ohio C.P. Ct. 1986).
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born child is a "person" under New York's Family Court Act.54 The Act
provides "[tihe purpose of Article 10 of the Family Court Act was'... to
establish procedures to help protect children from injury or mistreatment
and to help safeguard their physical, mental and emotional well being."' 55
In holding that an unborn child is a person and thereby entitled to the
protection of the act,56 In re Smith relied on Roe v. Wade.57 The United
States Supreme Court in Roe said that the state has an "important and
legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.",58 The In
re Smith court concluded that the state's interest becomes paramount to
the parent's interest at the point the fetus is considered viable; thus, in
this case, temporary custody of the child was appropriate.59
An Ohio court in In re Ruiz also predicated its holding on Roe.6' It
declared that a viable fetus was a child under Ohio's existing child abuse
statute, and that injury to the fetus after that point constituted abuse. 61
In Ruiz, the court examined whether a finding of child abuse could be
predicated solely on the prenatal conduct of the mother after a woman
gave birth to a child born addicted to cocaine and heroin.62 The statute at
issue prohibited "any parent or guardian from creating 'a substantial risk
to the health or safety of the child, by violating a duty of care, protection,
or support."'63 The statute also defined a "child" as a "person who is
under the age of eighteen years."'64 In finding that a viable fetus was a
child under the statute, the court stated "the essence of Roe, [which is]
the state's interest in the potential human life at the time of viability...
compels a holding that a viable unborn fetus is to be considered a child
under the [statute]. 65 Consequently, the Ruiz court concluded that the
state should assert custody of the child.66
Thus, in states where child abuse and neglect proceedings have been
used successfully against maternal substance abusers, the fetus has come
54. Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
58. Id. at 162.
59. Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
60. In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 937 (Ohio C.P. Ct. 1986).
61. Id. at 939.
62. Id. at 935-36.
63. Id. at 936.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 938.
66. Id. at 939.
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under the protection of the statute when it has been imported into the
definition of "child" or "person."
2. Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings Unsuccessfully Used
Although many states have successfully used the child abuse and ne-
glect statutes, 67 particularly when states assert temporary custody of the
child, courts also have refused to consider a woman's substance abuse
during pregnancy as a basis for permanent termination of her parental
rights. In a Connecticut case, In re Valerie D., a woman ingested cocaine
after her water had broken, some eight to ten hours before delivery. 68
Her daughter Valerie was born exhibiting many of the classic signs of
cocaine withdrawal; a urine test revealed cocaine in the infant's blood-
stream.69 Consequently, the state sought to terminate the mother's pa-
rental rights on the basis that her prenatal substance abuse resulted in the
child being denied the "care, guidance or control necessary for [her]
physical, educational, moral or emotional well being," and, further, that
the child had "sustained a nonaccidental or inadequately explained seri-
ous injury.",70
The trial court found Valerie to be a neglected child under the statute
and terminated the mother's parental rights, stating "[t]he fact that the
act resulting in the detriment to the child occurred prior to birth does not
require the conclusion that the child's condition at birth was other than
that of a neglected child.",71 The appellate court declined to upset the
trial court's holding, finding that "a petition for neglect or termination of
parental rights can be based solely on a mother's prenatal conduct., 7 1
67. See In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); In re Smith, 492
N.Y.S.2d 331 (Fam. Ct. 1985); and In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. Ct. 1986). See
also In re Solomon L., 190 Cal. App. 3d 1106 (Ct. App. 1987) (mother's use of drugs during
pregnancy constituted neglect for purpose of termination action); In re Troy D., 215 Cal.
App. 3d 889 (Ct. App. 1989) (mother's prenatal use of dangerous drugs is probative of
future child neglect and shows that child is at risk and needs the court's protection); and In
re Stefanel 'lyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1990) (mother's prenatal use of
cocaine is sufficient to bring a cause of action for neglect and may be considered as a basis
for termination of parental rights; court also found that the state's child abuse and neglect
statute includes unborn children).
68. In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d 748, 756 (Conn. 1992).
69. Id. at 757. "At birth the child was pale, had poor muscle tone and required oxygen
.... At times, she was extraordinarily jittery and shaky, had a piercing cry, was unable to
make eye contact, and required special care, such as swaddling, vertical rocking and elimi-
nation of all stimuli." Id.
70. Id. at 755.
71. In re Valerie D., 595 A.2d 922, 923 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
72. Id. at 925.
1997]
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The Connecticut Supreme Court later reversed the appellate court,
however, basing its holding on the traditional rules of statutory interpre-
tation and legislative intent.73 The court also relied on state and federal
court decisions that hold parents have a fundamental liberty interest in
their children."4 Of primary concern to the court was whether the legisla-
ture intended the language of the termination statute to reach prenatal
parental conduct that harmed a child even shortly before its birth. In
making its determination, the supreme court adopted a strict construction
approach, looking at specific definitions of "parent" and "child."7 6 The
court concluded that, when looked at in its entirety, the statute clearly
was intended to apply to a child who already had been born.77 The court
also looked at the legislative history of two proposed bills that dealt with
the problem of prenatal substance abuse78 and concluded that the legisla-
ture favored a rehabilitative rather than a punitive approach.79
The Connecticut court's deference to legislative intent was followed in
a recent Arizona case. In In re Appeal No. S-120171,80 the trial court
severed parental rights on the grounds of abuse and neglect due to the
mother's consumption of alcohol during pregnancy and the father's ap-
parent unwillingness to intervene.8" The court found that the legislature
did not intend the term "child" as it appeared in the severance statute to
include a fetus, and thus the mother's consumption of alcohol during
pregnancy could not be the basis for a finding of abuse.82 As in Valerie
D., the court in In re Appeal No. S-1201 71 touched on the fundamental
right of a parent to retain custody and control of his or her child.83 Con-
73. In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d 748, 753, 759 (Conn. 1992).
74. Id. at 759.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 760. " '[P]arent' means a natural or adoptive parent. ... 'Child' means any
person under sixteen years of age .... [this] suggests a limitation on the applicability of
that definition to a person who has been born, since that is the ordinary beginning point of
one's 'age."' Id.
77. Id. "Thus, until the moment of birth, Valerie was not a 'child' within the meaning
of [the statute] and, therefore, the 'act ... of parental commission that took place before
that moment cannot be considered to be parental conduct that 'denied [her] ... the care
* . .necessary for [her] physical ... well-being.' " Id.
78. Id. at 762, 764.
79. Id. at 762, 765.
80. In re Appeal No. S-120171, 905 P.2d 555 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
81. Id. "It is undisputed that A. and T. were harmed by the mother's ingestion of
alcohol during pregnancy. T. suffers from fetal alcohol syndrome; A.'s condition is some-
what less severe but he also suffered some fetal alcohol effects." Id. at 556-57.
82. Id.
83. Id. See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that proof of neglect
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sequently, the severance statute should not be broadly construed to in-
clude an unborn child.8 4 The court concluded that "chronic substance
abuse during pregnancy in and of itself does not reflect an inability to
parent that would justify severance of a parent's fundamental rights."85
3. Protective Custody/Civil Commitment Orders
States have used another civil action to deal with maternal substance
abuse: the protective custody/civil commitment order, whereby a preg-
nant woman is placed in protective custody to prevent further harm to
the fetus.86 Courts generally have been more reluctant to grant these
than temporary custody orders in neglect proceedings because custody/
civil commitment orders are more violative of a woman's constitutional
liberty interests. The protective custody of the fetus obviously requires
concurrent custody of the mother,8 7 whereas temporary custody orders
only require custody of the child.
Most of the early civil commitment cases involved a woman's objection
to a cesarean section or a blood transfusion, and in these contexts, the
courts generally have ordered women to comply with medical advice to
prevent harm to their fetuses.88 This judicial willingness to intervene and
override maternal autonomy has led some states to attempt to use protec-
tive custody orders in the maternal substance abuse area.89
In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital, a Georgia woman in
her thirty-ninth week of pregnancy had complete placenta previa, a con-
dition in which the placenta blocks the birth canal and prevents vaginal
delivery.9" She refused a cesarean delivery on religious grounds, even
though there was a ninety-nine percent chance of death for the fetus and
by clear and convincing evidence is constitutionally required before state may terminate
parental rights).
84. In re Appeal, 905 P.2d at 558.
85. Id.
86. BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 245 (6th ed. 1990) ("[c]ivil commitment" is "[a] form
of confinement order used in the civil context for those who are mentally ill, incompetent,
alcoholic, drug addicted, etc."). Id. at 1223 ("[p]rotective custody" is "[t]he condition of
one who is held under authority of law for his own protection as in the case of... a person
who because of mental illness or drug addiction may harm himself or others.").
87. State v. Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
88. Patricia A. King, Helping Women Helping Children: Drug Policy and Future Gen-
erations, 69 THE MILBANK Q. 595, 606 (1991).
89. See Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d at 482; and United States v. Vaughn, 117 Daily Wash. L.
Rep., Mar. 7, 1989, at 441 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 1988).
90. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga. 1981).
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a fifty percent risk of death for the mother.91 The court found that the
state's interest in the life of the unborn child outweighed the intrusion
into the life of the parents, and granted temporary custody of the fetus to
the county Department of Family and Children Services.92 The agency
was authorized to do whatever the physicians deemed necessary to save
the child.93
A District of Columbia case provides a sharp contrast to the holding in
Jefferson. In In re A.C., the trial court ordered a District of Columbia
woman who was dying of lung cancer to undergo a cesarean section that
would likely save the life of her twenty-six-week-old fetus.94 Although
the surgery was performed, both the mother and child died.95 In revers-
ing the opinion of the trial court, the appellate court stated the common
tenet of informed consent which is "that any person has the right to make
an informed choice, if competent to do so, to accept or forego medical
treatment."96 The court concluded that a competent pregnant woman
can refuse any and all medical interventions, even at the risk of death or
damage to the fetus,97 and that to rule otherwise would not only erode
the trust between doctor and patient, but serve to drive women out of the
health care system.98 It went on to say that "a fetus cannot have rights
.. . superior to those of a person who has already been born."99 In a
related case in Illinois, a twenty-two-year-old woman refused a drug-in-
duced or cesarean delivery for her thirty-six-week-old fetus whose life
was in danger due to placental insufficiency.100 The mother believed that
God's healing powers would produce the best result."0' Like the A.C.
court, the Mother Doe court held that a woman has the right to refuse
medical treatment, even if doing so endangers the life or health of her
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 459-60. The woman left the hospital against court orders and subsequently
delivered a healthy baby naturally. John J. Paris, S.J., The Case of Mother versus Fetus:
Planning on a Miracle, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Mar. 9, 1994, at 244.
94. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1243.
97. Id. at 1237.
98. Id. at 1248.
99. Id. at 1244.
100. Doe v. Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 327 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). "The failure of the pla-
centa-which acts as the fetus' lungs, digestive system and kidneys-can result in death or
irreversible brain damage to the fetus." Paris, supra note 93, at 244.
101. Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 327.
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viable fetus."02
A Wisconsin juvenile court and appellate court in State v. Kruzicki ex-
tended the Jefferson holding to a maternal substance abuse case. 10 3 Dur-
ing her pregnancy, the mother was screened for drugs by her obstetrician
after he suspected that she was abusing cocaine. 10 4 After the tests con-
firmed the presence of cocaine,10 5 the mother refused to seek voluntary
inpatient treatment, as counseled by her doctor. 0 6 Pursuant to
mandatory reporting requirements, the doctor conveyed his concerns to
the appropriate authorities, 10 7 and the protective custody action ordering
inpatient treatment and protection ensued.10 8
In ordering protective custody of the mother, the Kruzicki court held
that her viable fetus was a child within the meaning of the statute, and
that the state has a legitimate and compelling interest under Roe to pro-
vide protection to the fetus.10 9 Because such an order also requires cus-
tody of the mother, the court looked at whether a protective custody
order of a viable fetus is violative of the mother's constitutional due pro-
cess and equal protection rights." 0 Again, using Roe as support for pro-
tection of the fetus, the Wisconsin lower courts determined that no
violation of the mother's rights occurred, and that the order was constitu-
tional.' Two years later, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the
appellate court's decision on the basis of statutory construction, stating
that the legislature did not intend to include a fetus within the statute's
102. Id. at 326. "Doe vaginally delivered an apparently normal and healthy, although
somewhat underweight, baby boy on December 29, 1993." Id. at 329.
103. State v. Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
104. Id. at 485.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The following are statements from the reporting affidavit of the mother's
obstetrician:
10. As a licensed obstetrician, it is my opinion that [Angela's] active cocaine
usage presents a real and immediate danger to the health[,] safety and continued
viability of her unborn child. 11. It is my opinion that without intervention forc-
ing [Angela] to cease her drug use that she will continue using cocaine and other
drugs with the following likely effects on her unborn child: low weight gain,
abruptio placentae, increased infectious diseases, hypertension and tachycardia,
preterm labor and delivery, possible precipitous delivery, and increased risks for
pregnancy loss, including spontaneous abortion and still birth, SIDS, congenital
malformations, intraventricular hemorrhage and precipitous labor.
Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 484.
110. Id.
111. Id.
1997]
224 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 14:211
definition of "child., 112 The court was clear that it was not basing its
decision on the propriety or morality of the mother's conduct, nor was it
examining her constitutional right to reproductive choice.' 1 3
Thus, while civil remedies for the maternal substance abuse problem
are available, they are sometimes difficult to apply due to constitutional
concerns. Also, even when civil actions are used, they are often applied
inconsistently among the states, with little uniformity between neighbor-
ing jurisdictions. Because civil remedies have not yielded the desired re-
sults in reducing the scope of the maternal substance abuse problem,
states have turned to criminal sanctions to deter this conduct.
114
B. Criminal Actions
Prosecutors in some states have been very creative in molding existing
criminal statutes to address substance abuse by pregnant women. Prose-
cutors have used most frequently the criminal child endangerment and
abuse statutes, and the delivery and distribution of drugs statutes. Until
Whitner, however, even when the lower courts convicted women under
these statutes as applied to their prenatal drug use, the cases ultimately
failed on appeal.' 15
112. State v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 731-32 (Wis. 1997).
[W]e find a compelling basis for concluding that the legislature intended a 'child'
to mean a human being born alive. Code provisions dealing with taking a child
into custody, providing parental notification, and releasing a child from custody
would require absurd results if the ... definition of 'child' included a fetus. Each
of the provisions addresses a critical juncture in a [child custody] proceeding. Yet,
each also anticipates that the 'child' can at some point be removed from the pres-
ence of the parent. It is manifest that the separation envisioned by the statute
cannot be achieved in the context of a pregnant woman and her fetus.
Id. at 736.
113. Id. at 733.
114. See generally Note, Rethinking Motherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation
of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (1990). One of the earliest criminal prosecu-
tions of a woman for her prenatal conduct was a charge against Pamela Rae Stewart, a
California woman, for willfully omitting to furnish medical services to her fetus. Her alleg-
edly abusive conduct included disregarding her physician's advice to discontinue ampheta-
mine use during her pregnancy, to abstain from sexual intercourse because her placenta
had detached, and to seek immediate medical attention if she began to hemorrhage. Her
child suffered brain damage and died six weeks after birth. In dismissing the charges
against Stewart, the judge held that the statute under which she had been charged was not
intended to criminalize a woman's conduct during pregnancy, but instead was intended to
enforce parents' financial responsibilities to their children. Id.
115. Punishing, supra note 2, at 2.
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1. Child Endangerment and Abuse Statutes
A person is guilty of Endangering the Welfare of a Child when
he knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physi-
cal, mental, or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen years
old or directs or authorizes such child to engage in an occupa-
tion involving a substantial risk of danger to his life or health.116
This New York child endangerment statute 117 typifies those being used by
prosecutors in many states to convict women for their prenatal substance
abuse." 8 It is crucial to the successful application of these statutes to
prenatal substance abuse that an unborn child be included in the defini-
tion of "child."" ' 9 For example, in Reyes v. Superior Court, the court held
that the word "child" in California's felony child endangering statute did
not refer to an unborn child; thus, the mother's prenatal conduct was not
within conduct contemplated by the statute. 2 °
In Reinesto v. Superior Court, the prosecutor did not even attempt to
argue that the word "child" in the statute at issue included a fetus, be-
cause that argument was foreclosed by a prior holding.'12  Instead, the
state focused exclusively on the conduct of the mother and stated that
"by ingesting heroin during her pregnancy, the mother knowingly caused
injury to a child under circumstances likely to produce death or serious
physical injury in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated...
section 13-3623.B.1, a class 2 felony.' 122 In holding that the child abuse
statute did not apply to the mother's prenatal ingestion of heroin, the
116. State v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843, 844 (City Ct. 1992) (emphasis added).
117. Id.
118. See Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Reyes v. Supe-
rior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214 (Ct. App. 1977); Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla.
1992); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993); State v. Morabito, 580
N.Y.S.2d 843 (City Ct. 1992); and State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992).
119. Punishing, supra note 2, at 2.
120. Reyes, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 216. Reyes was pregnant and addicted to heroin. She
was warned by a public health nurse that if she continued using heroin and failed to seek
prenatal medical care, the life and health of her child would be in danger. Nevertheless,
during the last two months of her pregnancy, Reyes continued to use heroin and failed to
seek prenatal care. She gave birth to twin boys addicted to heroin who subsequently suf-
fered withdrawal. Id.
121. Reinesto, 894 P.2d at 735.
In Vo, the state charged the defendant with two counts of first degree murder for
the deaths of a pregnant woman and her unborn fetus. After considering the
language of the statute, public policy, legislative intent, and the holdings in other
jurisdictions, this court held that the first-degree murder statute, A.R.S. section
13-1105, does not apply to the death of an unborn fetus.
Id.
122. Id. at 734 (her child was born addicted to heroin).
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court looked to the plain language of the statute and determined that
when the legislature intended to refer to an unborn child or fetus, it had
done so specifically.12 3 Because the legislature did not include a specific
reference to the unborn in § 13-3623.B.1, the Reinesto court stated it did
not intend for the child abuse statute to apply to "situations in which
harm to a fetus subsequently affects the newborn. "124
In its examination of the due process issue, the Arizona court focused
on the "fair notice" requirement that a person be informed that his or her
contemplated conduct is statutorily forbidden.1 2 1 "Because the statutory
reference-to 'child' does not include a fetus, petitioner could not reason-
ably have known she could be prosecuted for child abuse because of her
prenatal conduct."' 6 The Reinesto court saw a danger in interpreting the
statute too broadly, with the result being that many mothers would possi-
bly be subjected to "criminal liability for engaging in all sorts of legal or
illegal activities during pregnancy., 12 1
The Reinesto holding was also based on the principle that criminal stat-
utes should focus on the conduct of the accused, not on the status of the
alleged victim.1 2 8 The court stated, "If we adopt the state's position, we
would be focusing not on petitioner's conduct of ingesting heroin-con-
duct for which the state brought no criminal charge-but rather on the
123. Id. at 735.
For example, the manslaughter statute expressly prohibits 'knowingly or reck-
lessly causing the death of an unborn child at any stage of its development by any
physical injury to the mother of such child which would be murder if the death of
the mother had occurred.' A.R.S. @ 13-1103. The legislature also has elected to
use the death of an unborn child as an aggravating factor in criminal sentencing.
Id.
124. Id. at 736.
125. Id.
126. Id. See also State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (finding preg-
nant woman could not have known use of illegal drugs that affected the fetus could subject
her to criminal prosecution).
127. Reinesto, 894 P.2d at 737. See also Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 283
(Ky. 1993) (citing Commonwealth v. Kemp, 75 Westmoreland L.J. 5,12 (Pa. C.P. Ct. 1992),
aff'd, 643 A.2d 705 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)). The trial court in Kemp stated:
If the statutes at issue are applied to women's conduct during pregnancy, they
could have an unlimited scope and create an indefinite number of new
'crimes'.... In short, the District Attorney's interpretation of the statutes, if vali-
dated, might lead to a 'slippery slope' whereby the law could be construed as
covering the full range of a pregnant woman's behavior-a plainly unconstitu-
tional result that would, among other things, render the statutes void for
vagueness.
Kemp, 75 Westmoreland L.J. at 12.
128. Reinesto, 894 P.2d at 736.
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child's status as heroin-addicted.' 12 9
In State v. Gray, a woman was charged under Ohio's child endanger-
ment statute for ingesting cocaine during the third trimester of her preg-
nancy. 3 ' As in Reinesto, the court interpreted the plain language of the
words "parent" and "child" and determined that Gray did not become a
parent until her baby was born, and her "child did not become a 'child'
within the contemplation of the statute until she was born."'' Thus,
Gray could not be charged with child endangerment prior to the live birth
of her child.' 3 2 The Gray court also confronted the issue of fetal rights by
stating that when the legislature intended to address the concerns of the
unborn, it had referred to them specifically.' 33 By ruling in favor of the
state, the court would be creating fetal rights, which was clearly not the
express intent of the legislature."3
Gray is significant because it suggests that legislation could be passed
that would broaden the scope of Ohio's child endangerment statute to
cover prenatal substance abuse.1 35 The Gray court is not alone in its
viewpoint that the legislature is the best place to decide whether a partic-
ular statute should include the unborn. 36
In Commonwealth v. Welch, the Supreme Court of Kentucky explored
many of the same issues as the Gray and Reinesto courts. 137 Welch in-
volved a pregnant woman who was dependent on the drug oxycodone.138
Eight months into her pregnancy, she was arrested at a drug dealer's
home and found in possession of oxycodone and syringes. 139 At the time
of the arrest, Welch had just injected oxycodone into her veins.1 40 Ap-
proximately one month later, she gave birth to a boy who suffered from
129. Id.
130. State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992).
131. Id. at 711.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Cheri Hass, State v. Gray: De-Criminalization of Maternal Drug Abuse or a Mo-
mentary Reprieve?, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 1013, 1030 (1995).
135. Id. at 1013.
136. See Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214 (Ct. App. 1977); Johnson v.
State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993);
and State v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (City Ct. 1992).
137. Welch, 864 S.W.2d at 280.
138. Id. "Oxycodone hydrochloride" is a semi-synthetic narcotic analgesic with actions
similar to morphine. It can produce physical dependence. SAUNDERS DICTIONARY &
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LABORATORY MEDICINE AND TECHNOLOGY, 1126 (1984).
139. Welch, 864 S.W.2d at 280.
140. Id.
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neonatal abstinence syndrome.1 41 Welch was subsequently charged with
drug possession and criminal child abuse.
142
The trial court found Welch guilty on all charges, but the appellate
court vacated her conviction on the criminal child abuse charge. 143 In
affirming the appellate court's decision that the criminal child abuse stat-
ute did not apply to the mother's use of a controlled substance during
pregnancy, the supreme court looked at legislative intent regarding pre-
natal harm to a fetus and stated that the "courts cannot presume a legisla-
tive intent to expand the class of persons treatable as victims of criminal
activity.'
144
Like the Reinesto court, Welch expressed concern with criminalizing
maternal substance abuse:
The mother was a drug addict. But, for that matter, she could
have been a pregnant alcoholic, causing fetal alcohol syndrome;
or she could have been addicted to self abuse by smoking, or by
abusing prescription painkillers, or over-the-counter medicine;
or for that matter she could have been addicted to downhill ski-
ing or some other sport creating serious risk of prenatal injury
... [w]hat if a pregnant woman drives over the speed limit, or as
a matter of vanity doesn't wear the prescription lenses she
knows she needs to see the dangers of the road?145
The Welch court concluded that while the mother's possession of drugs is
a punishable offense, her punishment is not to be increased because she
happens to be pregnant, nor should she be punished for the harmful re-
sults of her conduct to her baby. 4 6 The court determined that to hold
otherwise would contravene the legislature's intention. 4 7
Thus, before Whitner, child endangerment and abuse statutes have not
been used successfully by prosecutors to punish the maternal substance
abuser. In these cases, the courts have examined the intent of the legisla-
ture, and consistently held that because the criminal statute at issue does
141. Id. Neonatal abstinence syndrome is characterized by mild temperature, irritabil-
ity, tremulousness, jittery movements, crying, and some mottling of the skin. Serious com-
plications can occur such as convulsions and seizures which could cause a cessation in
breathing and result in permanent brain damage or death. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 280-81.
144. Id. at 282.
145. Id. at 283.
146. Id. at 284.
147. Id.
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not specifically refer to the unborn, the pregnant woman did not have fair
notice that her conduct was violating the law.
2. Delivery and Distribution of Drugs Statutes
Prosecutors in Massachusetts, Florida, Georgia, and Michigan have
used statutes intended to punish drug dealers to charge maternal sub-
stance abusers with the crime of delivering drugs to a minor. 148 In an
attempt to avoid the emotionally charged and complex debate over when
a fetus becomes a person, prosecutors have focused on the one-to-two
minute interval between the time the baby is delivered and the moment
when the umbilical cord is cut and the child is separated physically from
the mother.149 The theory is that in these brief minutes the child has
been born and is now a "person" under the statute, and the mother is
actively "delivering" the drug through the unsevered umbilical cord.15 °
Probably the most well-known drug delivery case is Johnson v. State,1
51
where a Florida mother ingested cocaine prior to giving birth to her two
children, each of whom tested positive for the drug.' 52 Consequently, the
state brought charges against the mother for delivering a controlled sub-
stance to both of her children in violation of the delivery statute.
153
148. See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32
(Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 608 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1993); and State
v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991). See also infra notes 150-55 and accompa-
nying text.
149. Stovall, supra note 44, at 1269.
150. Id.
[A] mother's blood passes nutrients, oxygen and chemicals to an unborn child by
a diffusion exchange at the capillary'level from the womb to the placenta. The
umbilical cord then circulates the baby's blood (including the exchange from its
mother) between the placenta and the child. Metabolized cocaine derivatives in
the mother's blood thus diffuse from the womb to the placenta, and then reach
the baby through its umbilical cord. Although the blood flow is somewhat re-
stricted during the birthing process, a measurable amount of blood is transferred
from the placenta to the baby through the umbilical cord during delivery and
after birth.
Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1291.
151. Id. at 1288.
152. Timothy Sean McBride, Should States Criminally Prosecute Mothers for Delivering
Drugs to Their Newborns During the Birthing Process?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 251, 251
(1993) (the children were born in October 1987 and January 1989).
153. Id.
At trial, medical experts disagreed as to whether the cocaine from the mother's
blood had passed to the children before birth or during the sixty- to ninety-second
period after birth but before the umbilical cord was cut, a significant distinction
since the delivery statute only applies to children after birth.
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The trial court held that Johnson violated the state statute which pro-
hibits adults from delivering controlled substances to minors.154 The ap-
pellate court upheld the convictions, and the supreme court overturned
them, holding that the legislature did not intend for the term "delivery"
to apply to mothers passing controlled substances via the umbilical cord
to their babies after birth.155 The supreme court also held that the medi-
cal evidence did not sufficiently prove that drugs were in fact delivered to
the infants via the umbilical cord during the sixty- to ninety-second inter-
val immediately after birth.'56
Stating that "[1]egislative intent is the polestar by which the courts must
be guided,' 57 the Johnson court concluded that the legislature expressly
chose to treat maternal substance abuse as a public health problem and
rejected imposing criminal sanctions on these women.'58 Recognizing the
real-life implications of criminalizing maternal substance abuse, the Flor-
ida court said:
[P]rosecuting women for using drugs and 'delivering' them to
their newborns appears to be the least effective response to this
crisis. Rather than face the possibility of prosecution, pregnant
women who are substance abusers may simply avoid prenatal or
medical care for fear of being detected. Yet the newborns of
these women are, as a group, the most fragile and sick, and most
in need of hospital neonatal care. A decision to deliver these
babies 'at-home' will have tragic and serious consequences.' 59
In strong language, the court concluded its holding by stating that it "de-
clines the state's invitation to walk down a path that the law, public pol-
icy, reason and common sense forbid it to tread.' 60
In the related case of State v. Hardy, a Michigan woman ingested crack
154. Id. at 252.
155. Id.
156. Id. The supreme court adopted the appellate court analysis concerning the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence to support Johnson's conviction and the legislative intent of the
dissent by Judge Sharp. The supreme court felt that Judge Sharp's application of strict
construction was correct, but that she did not apply the rule of lenity regarding the use of
the word "delivery" in the statute. The rule of strict construction demands that courts
strictly construe criminal statutes, and that when ambiguities exist, the statute shall be con-
strued most favorably to the accused. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1992).
The rule of lenity "provides that where there is ambiguity in the language of a statute
concerning multiple punishment, ambiguity should be reserved in favor of lenity in sen-
tencing." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 902 (6th ed. 1990).
157. Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1293.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1295-96.
160. Id. at 1297.
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less than thirteen hours before giving birth, resulting in cocaine metabo-
lites in her child's urine.16 She was charged with child abuse and deliv-
ery of cocaine to her child.162 The circuit judge dismissed the child abuse
charge, but upheld the delivery of cocaine charge. 163 On appeal, the
court determined that the legislature did not intend the statute to reach
the conduct of this mother."6 Recalling the fair notice issue raised in
Reinesto, the Michigan court stated that "[a] person is not required, at
peril of life, liberty, or property, to speculate concerning the meaning of
criminal statutes., 16
5
The Hardy concurrence focused directly on the fetal rights issue.
1 6 6
The concurrence stated that the delivery statute used the word "person,"
which is, in essence, a legal entity; thus, it reasoned, since a fetus is not a
legal entity, the law cannot be applied to an unborn child.1 67 Basing its
holding on Roe,168 the concurrence declared: "[a]lthough an unborn fetus
is considered to be a 'potential human being,' entitled to protection in its
advanced stage of development, it is not afforded the full rights and obli-
gations of a person, an individual, or a legal entity." '169
State v. Luster also addressed the issue of fair notice in deciding
whether the prenatal conduct of the mother was encompassed by Geor-
gia's drug delivery statute. 7 ° One day after the woman's daughter was
born, a urine sample was taken from the child which tested positive for
cocaine metabolites.17 1 Based on the test results, Luster was charged
with delivery and distribution of cocaine to her daughter.172 The court
concluded that Luster did not receive fair warning that her use of illegal
drugs while pregnant, which subsequently affected her fetus, would sub-
ject her to criminal prosecution. 173
161. State v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 51 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 52.
164. Id. at 53.
165. Id. at 52.
166. Id. at 53-54.
167. Id. at 53.
168. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
169. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d at 54.
170. State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
171. Id. at 33.
172. Id. (note that the defendant was also charged with possession of cocaine, and that
this charge was not dismissed).
173. Id. at 34 (the Luster court is citing Waldroup v. State, 30 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. 1944):
"The unambiguous words of a criminal statute are not to be altered by judicial construction
so as to punish one not otherwise within its reach.").
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As with the child endangerment and abuse cases, the states also have
failed to prosecute successfully maternal substance abusers under deliv-
ery and distribution of drugs statutes. The cases have been decided on
the basis of legislative intent, in that the word "delivery" does not apply
to the mother-umbilical cord-child context. The fair notice issue also has
been raised, and the courts stated that the legislature did not intend to
reach the conduct of a maternal substance abuser when it created these
statutes.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE WHITNER DECISION
A. Background of the Case
In Whitner v. State, the South Carolina Supreme Court became the first
in the nation to hold that a pregnant woman can be criminally liable for
endangering a fetus through her prenatal substance abuse.174 Accord-
ingly, the court found that a viable fetus can be considered a "person"
under the state's child abuse and endangerment statute.175
In 1989, the City of Charleston, South Carolina, established a collabo-
rative effort among the police department, the prosecutor's office, and a
state hospital to punish pregnant women and new mothers under the
state's child abuse laws if they tested positive for cocaine. 176 Women who
met these criteria were threatened with arrest but told that they could
avoid it if they stopped using drugs and entered a drug treatment pro-
gram.177 The problem was that only one drug treatment facility was
available that would admit pregnant women, but it was not designed to
meet their special needs.1 78 As a result, women who obtained medical
attention at the state hospital and tested positive for cocaine were given
essentially the "non-choice" of inappropriate treatment or jail.1 79
In February 1992, at a state hospital, Cornelia Whitner gave birth to a
baby who tested positive for cocaine but was otherwise healthy.' 81 She
was charged with criminal child neglect, to which she pleaded guilty and
174. Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *1 (Sup. Ct. S.C. July 15,
1996).
175. State's Highest Court Asked to Rehear Case on Prenatal Conduct; Medical and
Health Groups Stress Wide Implications of Ruling, Center for Reprod. Law & Pol'y, at 1
(July 30, 1996) [hereinafter Prenatal Conduct].
176. Punishing, supra note 2, at 4.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Prenatal Conduct, supra note 175, at 2.
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was sentenced to eight years in prison.' 81 After serving approximately
nineteen months in jail, Whitner filed a motion for post-conviction relief,
arguing that she was wrongly charged and convicted, and given ineffective
assistance of counsel.' 82 The motion was granted. 183 In November 1993,
the Court of Common Pleas found that South Carolina's child neglect
statute was not intended to apply to the unborn; thus, it could not be used
to prosecute a woman for prenatal conduct towards her fetus. 1 84 Conse-
quently, "Whitner had pleaded guilty to and was convicted of a nonexis-
tent crime. 185
In July 1996, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Common Pleas' decision, and at the time of this writing, Whitner is wait-
ing to see if she will be returning to prison to finish her sentence.186
Whitner filed a petition in July 1996, asking the state's high court to re-
consider its ruling.187
B. The Supreme Court of South Carolina's Decision
South Carolina's child abuse and endangerment statute reads:
Any person having the legal custody of any child or helpless per-
son, who shall, without lawful excuse, refuse or neglect to pro-
vide ... the proper care and attention for such child or helpless
person, so that the life, health or comfort of such child or help-
less person is endangered or is likely to be endangered, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished within the discre-
tion of the circuit court.' 88
The state argued that this statute included actions and conduct by the
mother that endangered, or were likely to endanger, the life, comfort, or
health of a viable fetus.1 89
In deciding whether a viable fetus is a person for purposes of the stat-
ute, the court looked at "not merely the language of the particular clause
being construed, but the word and its meaning in conjunction with the
181. Id.
182. Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *3 (Sup. Ct. S.C. July 15,
1996) (Whitner stated that had her attorney advised her that the statute did not expressly
apply to her prenatal conduct she would never have pleaded guilty and been convicted).
183. Id.
184. Prenatal Conduct, supra note 175, at 2.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *5 (Sup. Ct. S.C. July 15,
1996) (emphasis added).
189. Id.
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purpose of the whole statute and the policy of the law."1 9 The court also
considered the way South Carolina law treats the unborn in other con-
texts, and found that the word "person" as used in both wrongful death
and homicide statutes includes viable fetuses."' Thus, the court reasoned
"it would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person for purposes
of homicide laws and wrongful death statutes but not for purposes of stat-
utes proscribing child abuse."' 92 Although the statute does not expressly
apply to viable fetuses, the court determined that the overall purpose of
the South Carolina Children's Code, with its emphasis on prevention, in-
dicated that the legislature intended for viable fetuses to be protected. 93
Whitner made several arguments to the court stating why the words
"child" and "person" did not include viable fetuses. First, Whitner ar-
gued that several bills introduced in the state legislature specifically ad-
dressed maternal substance abuse, including some that would criminalize
such conduct. 194 Whitner claimed because so many bills had been intro-
duced on this subject, legislators must have believed that no existing leg-
islation addressed the issue. 195 Thus, she asserted that the legislature did
not intend the child abuse and endangerment statute to encompass abuse
or neglect of a viable fetus.' 96
The court rebutted her argument by saying that the statutory language,
not subsequent legislative acts, is the clearest guide to legislative in-
tent.197 The court also referred to the existing tort and criminal law to
bolster its conclusion that the statutory meaning of the word "person"
190. Id. at *6.
191. Id. at *9. Although neither § 15-51-10 ("[c]ivil action for wrongful act causing
death") or § 16-3-10 ("'[m]urder' defined") of the Code of Laws of South Carolina specifi-
cally mention the word "fetus," the majority opinion in Whitner cited three cases which
held that the word "person" as used in a statute includes viable fetuses. S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 15-51-10, 16-3-10 (Law Co-op. 1976). In State v. Home, the defendant stabbed his preg-
nant wife in the abdomen, resulting in the viable fetus' death. The defendant was con-
victed of voluntary manslaughter (feticide), with the court holding that the word "person"
as used in a criminal statute includes viable fetuses. State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C.
1984). Hall v. Murphy said that a civil wrongful death action lies where the fetus is injured
while viable, is subsequently born alive, and then dies as a result of the prenatal injuries.
Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790 (S.C. 1960). Similarly, in Fowler v. Woodward, the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that a viable fetus injured before birth may, after birth,
through another, maintain a civil wrongful death action for such prenatal injuries. Fowler
v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964).
192. Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *9.
193. Id. at *10.
194. Id. at *10-11.
195. Id. at *11.
196. Id.
197. Id.
Whitner v. State
included viable fetuses. 198
Second, Whitner argued that applying the statute to viable fetuses
"would lead to absurd results obviously not intended by the legisla-
ture."1 99 Whitner argued that if the word "child" is interpreted to include
viable fetuses, then all conduct, legal or illegal, by a pregnant woman that
endangers, or is likely to endanger, a fetus would constitute neglect.200
The court was unpersuaded by this argument. Under the current stat-
ute, a parent could be prosecuted for both legal and illegal acts if the
child was being actually or potentially endangered by the conduct. 20' The
court saw no reason to make a distinction between "child" and "viable
fetus" as to the repercussions of a parent's harmful conduct. 20 2 The court
also said that it did not have to address "this potential parade of hor-
ribles, 2 3 because it was concerned only with Whitner's ingestion of
crack during her third trimester, which unequivocally "endangered the
life, health, and comfort of her child., 204
Both of the dissenting opinions in Whitner strongly disagreed with the
majority opinion that a viable fetus constitutes a "child" and/or a "per-
son" under the statute. 20 5 Whereas the majority believed the statutory
language was unambiguous, the dissent found that ambiguities were cre-
ated by the court's reliance on case holdings in two entirely different
fields of law: civil wrongful death and common law feticide.2 °6 The dis-
sent stated that when ambiguities are present "we are bound by the rules
of statutory construction to strictly construe a criminal statute in favor of
the defendant., 20 7
The dissent also argued that the words "legal custody" in the statute
precluded a finding that a viable fetus is a child, as the concept of legal
custody is not applicable to the unborn.20 8 In addition, the dissent was
concerned with the scope of maternal conduct that now would be grounds
for neglect: "the impact of today's decision is to render a pregnant wo-
man potentially criminally liable for myriad acts which the legislature has
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at *12-13.
201. Id. at *13.
202. Id.
203. Id. at *14.
204. Id.
205. Id. at *27, *31.
206. Id. at *29.
207. Id. at *30.
208. Id. at *28, *31.
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not seen fit to criminalize. To ignore this 'down-the-road' consequence in
a case of this import is unrealistic., 20 9
C. Extension of Whitner to Maternal Abuse of a Legal Substance:
State v. Zimmerman
It is difficult to discern whether the radical departure Whitner takes, in
holding a woman criminally liable for her prenatal substance abuse, rep-
resents only an aberrational response or a significant judicial trend. The
Whitner court made it clear that its holding applied to legal as well as
illegal substances.2z l This may explain the recent Wisconsin case of State
v. Zimmerman,2n where the defendant became the first woman in the
country to be charged with attempted murder for drinking alcohol while
pregnant.212
In March 1996, Deborah Zimmerman, who was nine months pregnant,
consumed large quantities of alcohol and was taken to the hospital by her
mother.213 After a fetal heart tone monitor and an ultrasound detected
fetal abnormalities, doctors informed Zimmerman that her only chance
to save the baby's life was to have a cesarean section.214 Although she
vehemently protested, the cesarean was performed and she gave birth to
209. Id. at *31-32.
210. Id. at *13.
After the birth of a child, a parent can be prosecuted under section 20-7-50 for an
action that is likely to endanger the child without regard to whether the action is
illegal in itself. For example, a parent who drinks excessively could, under certain
circumstances, be guilty of child neglect or endangerment even though the under-
lying act-consuming alcoholic beverages-is itself legal.
Id.
211. Decision and Order Den. Mot. to Dismiss, State v. Zimmerman (Wis. Cir. Ct. Sept.
18, 1996) (No. 96-CF-525).
212. Abcarian, supra note 1, at E2. On March 24, 1997, Zimmerman was sentenced to
four years in prison and nine years of probation "for violating the bail terms by drinking."
She was sentenced for violating a probation requirement that she cease drinking alcohol
and undergo treatment. While out on bail, Zimmerman did not return to an alcohol treat-
ment program, and she even drank vodka during a caseworker's visit. As of this writing,
Zimmerman is still facing the criminal charges of attempted first degree intentional homi-
cide and first degree reckless conduct concerning her daughter. American Political Net-
work, Wisconsin: Woman Charged with Feticide Violates Bail Terms, ABORTION REP., Mar.
26, 1997, at 2.
213. Anne Marie O'Neill et al., Under the Influence: Drunk While Pregnant, a Woman
is Charged with Trying to Kill Her Baby, PEOPLE WEEKLY, Sept. 9, 1996, at 53.
214. Decision and Order Den. Mot. to Dismiss at 2-3, State v. Zimmerman (Wis. Cir.
Ct. Sept. 18, 1996) (No. 96-CF-525).
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a baby girl with a blood alcohol level of .199%215 and who exhibited signs
of FAS. 2
16
Zimmerman was charged with attempted first degree intentional homi-
cide "by conduct which included knowingly consuming a near-lethal
amount of alcohol in the hours prior to [the infant's] birth., 217 She was
also charged with "first degree reckless conduct arising out of the same
course of behavior., 218 The court found the necessary mens rea for the
criminal charges from Zimmerman's statement to the nurse at the hospi-
tal: "I'm going to kill this thing because I don't want it anyways.,
219
Zimmerman can be distinguished from the other maternal substance
abuse ca:ses because she clearly stated her intention to harm her fetus. In
cases like Whitner, on the other hand, the defendant engaged in harmful
prenatal conduct but never expressed harmful intent. In denying Zim-
merman's motion to dismiss, the circuit court judge said, "The instrumen-
tality of the attempted homicide in this case was not the shooting of a
bullet or the plunging of a knife. Instead, it was the massive consumption
of a potentially deadly quantity of alcohol.,
20
Even though the Zimmerman case deals with an attempted murder
charge, instead of a child endangerment or a drug delivery charge, the
underlying issues are the same: is a fetus a child, what are the mother's
rights as balanced against the fetus', and how far will states go in regulat-
ing a pregnant woman's conduct? If the Zimmerman prosecution is suc-
cessful, it means that Whitner will have been taken one step further in
holding a pregnant woman criminally liable for acts that harm her baby in
utero-that step being the extension of liability to abuse of a legal sub-
stance, alcohol. Such a decision by the Zimmerman court undoubtedly
215. Id. at 3-4. This is almost twice the level required to be legally intoxicated in Wis-
consin. O'Neill, supra note 213, at 53.
216. Decision and Order Den. Mot. to Dismiss at 3-4, State v. Zimmerman (Wis. Cir.
Ct. Sept. 18, 1996) (No. 96-CF-525).
217. Id. at 1.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 8-9.
220. Id. at 8. The judge continued, stating:
It remained active in the defendant's body long enough for the defendant's child
to be born with a .199 percent blood alcohol reading. The convergence in time of
the instrumentality of murder (alcohol) with the victim being born was not instan-
taneous such as when a bullet is fired from a gun toward a human target. Never-
theless, the convergence occurred and the elements of the crime have been
established for probable cause purposes.
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would pave the way for attempts to regulate further a pregnant woman's
conduct.
D. Extension of Whitner to Creation of "Fetal Abuse Statutes"
Not only has the Whitner holding given prosecutors in other states the
"green light" to continue to apply creatively existing criminal statutes to
maternal substance abusers, it may lead to appellate courts ruling differ-
ently in these cases, as well as state legislatures enacting specific fetal
abuse statutes. Although no state has yet enacted a fetal abuse statute,
state legislatures have introduced numerous bills criminalizing harmful
maternal behavior.22' If such laws are passed, then clearly Whitner was
not simply an aberrational judicial response, but, indeed, the "wave of the
future" for maternal substance abuse cases.
IV. CAN WHITNER WITHSTAND CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY?
Critical to a proper analysis of Whitner, or any other maternal sub-
stance abuse case, is the recognition that there are three parties in inter-
est: the mother, the fetus, and the state. The law has accorded each
different rights and interests, and when these collide there are no easy
answers. However, in this complex and ever-changing area of the law,
one thing is certain: over two decades ago, the United States Supreme
Court, in Roe v. Wade, recognized that women have a significant privacy
right. 22 This privacy right has profoundly influenced the way women
view themselves in society, and has affected women's decisions and how
they order their lives.223 If states are going to intervene in situations
where a fetus is being harmed by the prenatal conduct of its mother, they
should tread carefully.
A. The Woman's Right of Privacy
While the United States Constitution does not explicitly mention any
right of privacy, a line of Supreme Court decisions recognizes certain
"zones of privacy" that are regarded as fundamental.224 Included in these
zones of privacy are personal rights that bear some connection to mar-
riage,225 procreation,226 contraception,227 family relationships,228 or child
221. Punishing, supra note 2, at 2, 7.
222. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
223. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856
(1992).
224. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
225. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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rearing and education.2 29 The state may not impose restrictions on these
fundamental rights unless it has a compelling interest in doing So.230
In the landmark case of Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court extended
these zones of privacy to encompass a woman's decision, through consul-
tation with her physician, to terminate her pregnancy.231 The Court
found this privacy right posited in the Fourteenth Amendment; however,
it also held that the right to terminate a pregnancy is not absolute. 232 At
viability, the Court reasoned, the fetus presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb.233 Thus, at the point the fe-
tus becomes viable, the state has a compelling interest in protecting po-
tential life.234
The Roe Court clearly stated "that the word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn., 235 On the one
hand, the Court recognized that after fetal viability the state has an inter-
est in potential life, which surpasses the right of the mother to terminate
her pregnancy.236 On the other hand, however, Roe is clear that a fetus is
226. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
227. Ei:;enstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
228. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
229. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
230. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). A "compelling state interest" is "one
which the state is forced or obliged to protect." BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 282 (6th ed.
1990).
231. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
232. Id. at 153-54.
233. Id. at 163. Roe has been heavily criticized, largely due to the faulty reasoning of
the trimesi:er framework. As medical science has advanced the point of viability ever-
closer to the time of conception, the Roe trimester framework has become increasingly
illogical. While the Court in Webster did not expressly overrule Roe, it did reject its trimes-
ter framework when it held that the state has a compelling interest whenever the fetus
becomes viable, not just during the third trimester. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv.,
492 U.S. 4)0, 518, 521 (1989).
234. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. The state has an interest in protecting women's health, and it
also has an interest in protecting potential human life. Id. As one commentator notes:
Under Roe, during the first trimester of pregnancy, the state's interests are never
compelling, and the state may not intervene in a woman's decision to abort. Af-
ter the first trimester, the state has a compelling interest in women's health, which
it may protect by regulating abortion. At viability-which the Roe court consid-
ered the beginning of the third trimester-the state's interest in protecting poten-
tial human life becomes compelling, and the state may prohibit abortions not
necessary to save the life or health of the woman.
Kristen Rachelle Lichtenberg, Gestational Substance Abuse: A Call for a Thoughtful Leg-
islative Rerponse, 65 WASH. L. REV. 377, 382 (1990).
235. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
236. Id. at 163.
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not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment.
237
B. The Fetus' Developing Rights
Early common law considered the mother and fetus one entity.
238
Legal protection was bestowed on the fetus at birth, because it was only
then that it was considered to be capable of surviving independently of its
mother.239 Today "[v]iability has come to be understood as the level of
developmental maturity at which a fetus will continue to live and develop
even if physically separated from its mother." 240 The development of "fe-
tal rights," the concept that a fetus has separate interests equal to or
greater than those of a pregnant woman, reflects an increasing awareness
in our society of the individuality of the unborn.24 1
Today fetuses have definitive rights under both property and tort
law. 242 Under traditional tort rules, a fetus had to be born alive if there
was to be recovery for injury.24 3 But in most jurisdictions today, wrongful
death suits may be brought on behalf of fetuses, with recovery usually
limited to those cases where the fetus was viable at the time of the tort.2 44
237. Id. at 158. While the Roe court did not recognize Fourteenth Amendment rights
for fetuses, it left unanswered the question whether they could claim other types of rights.
As one commentator suggested, "the states [should have] the power to grant legal recogni-
tion to the unborn in non-14th Amendment situations." John E. B. Myers, Abuse and
Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 3, 15 (1984).
238. In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 936 (Ohio C.P. Ct. 1986).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 938.
241. Id. at 936.
242. Id. at 937. Under property law, fetuses have the right to inherit, and under tort
law, all jurisdictions allow a child to sue a third party for the consequences of prenatal
injuries. Lichtenberg, supra note 234, at 383.
243. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at
369-70 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the development of the live birth requirement).
244. Note, Material Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of
"Fetal Abuse," 101 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1004 (1988). Seven states have held that a non-
viable fetus can be considered a person in wrongful death claims. In a recent South Da-
kota case, the court allowed a woman a wrongful death recovery when she contracted
salmonella poisoning from a food company's chicken dish and subsequently lost her seven-
week-old fetus. The food company argued that it was legally inconsistent to allow a wrong-
ful death action for a nonviable fetus when state law permits a woman to abort her fetus up
to the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy. Declaring that "the concept of viability is outmo-
ded in tort law," the court held that the fetus, viable or not, was a person for the purpose of
the civil action. Scot Lehigh, Common Sense, Or a New Way to Ban Abortion?, THE Bos-
TON GLOBE, Sept. 15, 1996, at D3. Another recent case occurred in West Virginia, where
the court held that an 18-week-old fetus qualified as a person under the state's wrongful
death statute, thus permitting a man who lost his wife and unborn child in a car accident to
seek damages for both. Id.
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Currently in all fifty states, a fetus that is subsequently born alive can,
through a representative, bring a tort action against a third party for pre-
natal injuries.245 Only one state has allowed the mother herself to be
held civilly liable for prenatal tortious conduct which harms her baby.246
Fetal rights under criminal law are not nearly as broad as they are
under civil law. Under traditional common law principles, "murder was
limited 'to the killing of one who has been born alive."' 24 7 The Model
Penal Code, after which many states pattern their own criminal codes,248
follows this common law rule and does not mention "fetus" anywhere in
its criminal homicide section.249 Indeed, the Model Penal Code specifi-
cally defines "human being" as "a person who has been born and is
alive. ''25 In some jurisdictions, third parties may be held liable for inten-
tional acts that harm a fetus.25' These third parties are usually charged
245. Victoria J. Swenson & Cheryl Crabbe, Pregnant Substance Abusers: A Problem
That Won't Go Away, 25 ST. MARY'S L. J. 623, 638 (1994).
246. Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Mich. Ct. Cl. 1980) (child sued his mother
for negligence in failing to seek proper prenatal medical care, alleging that her continued
ingestion of tetracycline during pregnancy caused his teeth to turn brown). A later Illinois
case criticiz:ed the Grodin court and refused to hold a mother liable for prenatal injuries
her child suffered in a car accident allegedly caused by her negligence. Stallman v. Young-
quist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988).
247. Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky. 1993). The "born alive doc-
trine" as used in the criminal common law can be traced back to the writings of Sir Edward
Coke, who was appointed Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench by King James I in 1613.
He stated:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by potion or otherwise killeth it in her
wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in her body, and she is
delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprison, and no murder; but if the
childe be born alive and dieth of the potion, battery, or other cause, this is
murder.
State v. Ashley, 670 So. 2d 1087, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Sir Edward Coke's
writings on the "born alive doctrine").
248. Welch, 864 S.W.2d at 281.
249. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (1962).
250. Id. at § 210.0. This definition was challenged in a California case where the state
charged the defendant with murder when he punched the mother in the abdomen, result-
ing in her baby being stillborn with a fractured skull. The court held that an unborn, viable
fetus was not a human being for the purposes of California's murder statute. Keeler v.
Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (1970). California Penal Code § 187(a) originally read
"[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought," but after the
Keeler decision the legislature amended the statute to read "[m]urder is the unlawful killing
of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West
Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
251. Li:htenberg, supra note 234, at 384. Statutes that specifically mention harm to a
fetus are CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West Supp. 1997); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.32.060(1)(b) (West 1988) which states that a person is guilty of first degree man-
slaughter when "[h]e intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by inflicting
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under either homicide or feticide statutes, but such criminal liability has
not been invoked often and is usually limited to viable fetuses.252
Thus, it appears that courts are more likely to find that the fetus has
rights under civil law rather than criminal law. But in both areas, the
rights of the unborn are primarily afforded when the fetus is viable, and
only then as to harms caused by non-maternal third parties.
C. When Maternal and Fetal Rights Collide
Pregnancy is a unique condition in which two entities are physically
joined. When the rights of the mother are viewed as entirely separate
from the rights of the fetus, the two are forced into an adversarial role
that does not encourage a healthy relationship.253 When the state's inter-
est in protecting potential human life is thrown into the mix, the situation
becomes even more complicated. Within this maze of confusion, courts
across the country are looking for answers, with disparate results.
1. Constitutional and Policy Concerns Regarding Civil Actions
Against Maternal Substance Abusers
In general, the civil sanctions that states have used against prenatal
substance abusers are less constitutionally violative than criminal prose-
cutions. The use of child abuse and neglect proceedings, which may re-
sult in temporary loss of custody or the termination of parental rights, are
predicated on the theory that prenatal substance abuse is probative of
future mistreatment.254 Evidence shows that a high correlation exists be-
tween parental substance abuse and child abuse. 255 The problem is exac-
erbated by the fact that children who have ingested harmful substances in
utero are often difficult to care for and require above average parenting
skills. 256
Civil child abuse and neglect proceedings deal with the child after he or
she is born; thus, they do not implicate the same constitutional issues of
privacy, bodily integrity, and personal autonomy that are raised when
any injury upon the mother of such child." Id. Quickening is "[t]he first motion of the
fetus in the womb felt by the mother, occurring usually about the middle of the term of
pregnancy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1247 (6th ed. 1990).
252. Note, supra note 244, at 1004-05. Courts have been split regarding whether to read
implied protection for the unborn into statutes that do not expressly mention fetuses. Id.
at 1005.
253. AMERICAN MEDICAL AsSOCIATION, supra note 9, at 2669.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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mother and child are one entity.2 57 One constitutional problem that is
raised, however, is that these proceedings are not being applied equally to
all women. 58 Women of color are having their children taken away from
them at a. higher rate than Caucasian women, even though the prevalence
of illegal drug usage is the same between the two groups. 9 This discrep
ancy may exist because minority women are more frequently patients at
state hospitals than Caucasian women and more subject to mandatory
reporting requirements.26° Thus, apparently an economic bias factors
into the application of these statutes.
In addition to this equal protection concern, another important issue
that is raised by maternal substance abusers, especially regarding the ter-
mination of parental rights, is the fundamental right a parent has in the
care and custody of his or her child.2 6' The Supreme Court has upheld
the right; of parents regarding the care and custody of their children in
several contexts, including education,2 62 religion,
63 and child rearing.2 6
Furthermore, in all child abuse cases, not just those involving substance
abuse, the state's primary responsibility is to reunite the family, not dislo-
cate its members.2 65 Consequently, it is extremely difficult to terminate
parental rights in most states.
The other civil penalty that states use to deal with the pregnant sub-
stance abuser is forced detention through protective custody orders or
civil commitment.266 These methods are much more violative of a wo-
man's constitutional right to liberty. Obviously, by placing the fetus in
257. Id.
258. Punishing, supra note 2, at 5.
259. Id. See also Ira J. Chasnoff, M.D. et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol
Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Flor-
ida, 322 NErw ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1204 (1990) (black women were approximately 10 times
more likely than white women to be reported to civil authorities if an infant was prenatally
exposed to an illegal drug). See generally Roberts, supra note 42, at 1419 (for a discussion
on the racial bias present in the punishment of maternal substance abusers).
260. Id. at 1432.
261. See In re Appeal No. S-120171, 905 P.2d 555 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); and In re
Valerie D., 613 A.2d 748 (Conn. 1992).
262. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
263. Set Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
264. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
265. Stovall, supra note 44, at 1284-85.
266. Punishing, supra note 2, at 6. Only the state of Minnesota has specifically
amended its laws to authorize civil commitment of a woman who habitually and exces-
sively uses drugs during pregnancy. Id.
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protective custody, the mother is also detained.2 67 Like neglect proceed-
ings, equal protection violations arise because civil commitment/protec-
tive custody orders are applied much more frequently and successfully
against minority women. 6 8
Usually, pregnant substance abusers come to the attention of the courts
through a drug-related crime they have committed, with the judge jailing
them through the "back door" to protect the fetus.26 9 For example, in
United States v. Vaughn, a District of Columbia court sentenced a woman
to six months in prison for check forgery, admitting she was given jail
time rather than the customary probation because she was pregnant and
had allegedly used cocaine. 270 The court stated the six-month sentence
was necessary to ensure Vaughn would not be released until her preg-
nancy was concluded, and that it was acting out of concern for the unborn
child.27 1
Unfortunately, incarcerating a mother for the benefit of the fetus is
often useless. Prisons, in general, have inadequate health care resources
and lack the specialized protocol and staff that a pregnant woman and her
272 wifetus require. Along with a lack of proper prenatal care, incarcerated
pregnant women are subject to such fetal health hazards as overcrowding;
complete lack of exercise and fresh air; a dirty and unsanitary environ-
ment; and exposure to such communicable diseases as hepatitis, measles,
and tuberculosis. 273 Finally, drugs are readily available in prison, so im-
prisonment does not guarantee that the maternal substance abuser will
not continue-and perhaps increase-her habit.27 4
One positive aspect of the forced detention situation, at least where the
woman is placed in a treatment center as opposed to a jail, is that the
woman is being treated and not punished. However, oftentimes when a
judge orders a stay in a treatment center, one is simply not available. Of
those that are, few of them are geared to the particularized needs of the
pregnant addict.275 Moreover, many treatment centers do not want to
accept pregnant women due to liability concerns, and those that do ac-
267. State v. Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
268. Roberts, supra note 42, at 1432-36.
269. Swenson & Crabbe, supra note 245, at 635.
270. See Punishing, supra note 2, at 6-7; and United States v. Vaughn, 117 Daily Wash.
L. Rep., Mar. 7, 1989, at 441, 446 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 1988).
271. Id. at 441.
272. AMERICAN MEDICAL AssOCIATION, supra note 9, at 2667.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 2669. In addition to prenatal care, most treatment centers do not offer assist-
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cept them have long waiting lists.2 76 Finally, even if enough treatment
centers were available that could handle the special needs of pregnant
substance abusers, most of these women could not pay for these pro-
grams nor does Medicaid typically cover this cost.
2 77
In sho:rt, even when court-ordered, obtaining treatment is not currently
a practical alternative for the maternal substance abuser. Some believe
that punishing a pregnant woman for not obtaining treatment for her sub-
stance abuse problem is an injustice when treatment is simply not avail-
able to her.278
2. Constitutional and Policy Concerns Regarding Criminal
Prosecutions Against Maternal Substance Abusers
Major constitutional concerns arise when a state, using either drug de-
livery laws or child endangerment statutes, elects to hold a woman crimi-
nally liable for her prenatal conduct towards a fetus. In these cases,
defendants argue that their due process, equal protection, and privacy
rights are being violated.27 9 Even though the mothers in these cases gen-
erally raise one or more constitutional claims, the courts almost always
refuse to consider them, instead basing their holdings on strict statutory
280construction.
Except: for the glaring exception of Whitner v. State, when women have
been charged with violating criminal child abuse laws, the courts have
found that the statutes only apply to children already born, not fetuses.28'
Similarly, in the drug delivery cases, the courts have determined that the
statutes only apply to situations where drugs are transferred between two
persons already born.282
Some constitutional scholars claim that criminal prosecutions of mater-
nal substance abusers violate due process because prosecutors and courts
ance with these women's day care needs for their older children, or provide counseling for
the victims of spousal or partner abuse. Id.
276. Id.
277. McGinley, supra note 26, at 12.
278. AMERICAN MEDICAL AsSOCIATION, supra note 9, at 2669.
279. Punishing, supra note 2, at 2-3.
280. Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *24 (Sup. Ct. S.C. July 15,
1996). An exception to this was seen in In re Valerie D., where the court held that parents
have a fundamental liberty interest, posited in the United States Constitution, in their chil-
dren. It must be noted, however, that this was a civil case, which may explain why the
court was more willing to explore the constitutional issues raised. In re Valerie D., 613
A.2d 748 (Conn. 1992).
281. Punishing, supra note 2, at 2.
282. Id.
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are applying the existing statute in an unforeseeable or unintended man-
ner.283 In so doing, the pregnant woman's due process rights are violated
because she did not receive the required notice that the statute would be
applied to fetuses and/or prenatal conduct.284 In addition, such statutes
may be found unconstitutionally vague because women have no way of
knowing what conduct is considered criminal.285
Prosecuting pregnant substance abusers also violates equal protection
on the basis of race and gender.286 Despite the fact that the use of illegal
drugs is similar along race and class lines, the majority of women prose-
cuted have been low income women of color.287 As one commentator
states: "[p]oor Black women have been selected for punishment as a re-
sult of an inseparable combination of their gender, race, and economic
status., 288 It has also been argued that maternal substance abuse prose-
cutions raise a gender bias, in that men who abuse drugs or alcohol dam-
age their sperm and, like substance-abusing women, place their future
children's health and well-being at risk.289 Yet, to date, no men have
been criminally charged for such conduct.29 °
Perhaps the most serious constitutional violation that is implicated
when women are held criminally liable for their prenatal conduct is the
right to privacy, which includes the right to procreate, the right to bodily
integrity,29' and the "right to be let alone., 292 In a rather unusual move,
the Massachusetts Superior Court, in Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, di-
rectly confronted the violation of a woman's right to privacy.293 Dis-
missing the mother's indictment for possession of cocaine, traces of which
283. Id. at 3.
284. Id. See Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 735 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); State
v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); and State v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 51
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
285. Reinesto, 894 P.2d at 736. See also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156 (1972) (holding vagrancy ordinance void for vagueness because of lack of notice and
resulting unfettered police discretion).
286. South Carolina Supreme Court Decision, Operation PAR, Inc., at 2 (July 23, 1996)
[hereinafter South Carolina].
287. Punishing, supra note 2, at 2. See also Chasnoff, supra note 259, at 1204.
288. Roberts, supra note 42, at 1424.
289. South Carolina, supra note 286, at 2.
290. Id.
291. Page McGuire Linden, Drug Addiction During Pregnancy: A Call for Increased
Social Responsibility, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 105, 127 (1995) (the "right to bodily
integrity" is the right of every individual to the possession and control of his or her own
person).
292. Punishing, supra note 2, at 3.
293. Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 608 N.E.2d 717, 718 (Mass. 1993).
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were found in her child's urine shortly after birth, the lower court held
that the mother had an overriding privacy interest in her child's medical
records. 94 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts subsequently
ruled that the mother had no privacy right in her child's medical records,
and that such a holding could be adverse to the child's best interests.a95
The right to procreate is violated when a woman elects to continue her
pregnancy and then is criminally penalized once she gives birth to a sub-
stance-addicted or impaired child.2 96 Conversely, a woman who feels
compelled to terminate her pregnancy in order to avoid arrest also exper-
iences a violation of her right to procreate.297 Ironically, while the al-
leged purpose of these prosecutions is to protect the fetus, the end result
may be an abortion, a complete and permanent end to the pregnancy. As
the court in Johnson v. State said, "[p]rosecution of pregnant women for
engaging in activities harmful to their fetuses or newborns may also un-
wittingly increase the incidence of abortion.,2 98
Related to the woman's right to privacy, specifically the right under
Roe to terminate a pregnancy, is the claim by some that "once a pregnant
woman forgoes her right to have an abortion she has a 'legal ... duty to
bring the child into the world as healthy as is reasonably possible.' 2
99
This duty to the fetus is compared to the duty of care that a parent has for
a child under tort law.3" However, unlike the duty of care that a parent
owes a born child, this "fetal" duty of care would impose restrictions on a
woman that might severely limit her freedom of action and possibly lead
to forcible bodily intrusion.3° 1
Furthermore, imposing a fetal duty on a woman who chooses to con-
tinue with her pregnancy assumes that she has "waived" her constitu-
tional rights to bodily integrity and privacy.302 Unless this waiver takes
place before a judge, it cannot be valid; the simple "fact that a woman
does not abort her fetus cannot be construed as the willing forfeiture of
her constitutional rights., 313 While a mother may have a moral responsi-
bility to ensure fetal health, this does not translate into a legal obligation.
294. Id. at 721.
295. Id.
296. Pusnishing, supra note 2, at 3.
297. Id
298. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1296 (Fla. 1992).
299. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 9, at 2669.
300. Id. at 2664.
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Prosecutors and courts have wrestled with other thorny issues in their
attempts to punish criminally the pregnant substance abuser. One such
issue is that it may be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that the woman
had the mens rea to intentionally harm her fetus. 30 4 Some drug- and al-
cohol-addicted women's lives are so chaotic and disorganized that they
may not even realize they are pregnant until they are well along in their
pregnancy.30 5 Additionally, the prenatal substance abuser may genuinely
not know that what she is ingesting may cause harm to her fetus.30 6 As
one court noted: "[i]n virtually all instances, a user specifically does not
want to harm her fetus, yet she cannot resist the drive to use the drug.
Thus, it is not plausible to attribute to drug-using women a motive of
causing harm to the fetus., 307
However, in State v. Zimmerman, the mother exhibited the required
mens rea for an attempted murder charge when she said, "I'm going to
kill this thing because I don't want it anyways. ''30 8 But note that when a
woman harms her in utero baby, she is also harming herself, which lends
further credence to the viewpoint that these self-destructive women need
help, not punishment.30 9 What prosecutors in the Zimmerman case failed
to mention to the media is that the mother also said she was "going to go
home and keep drinking ... myself [emphasis added] to death. '31 0
Yet another concern raised when maternal substance abusers are
charged criminally is that the state is deliberately misconstruing existing
statutes to create new offenses, in contravention of legislative intent.
Legislatures convey their intentions expressly when writing laws,3 1' and
to allow renegade prosecutors to draw their own judgments about the
meaning and application of a statute is an abuse of power. Furthermore,
in situations where the prosecutor deliberately misapplies a statute, the
304. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1296 (Fla. 1992).
305. Howard, supra note 19, at 649-50.
306. Linden, supra note 291, at 136.
307. Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1296 (emphasis added).
308. Decision and Order Den. Mot. to Dismiss at 3, State v. Zimmerman (Wis. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 18, 1996) (No. 96-CF-525).
309. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 9, at 2669.
310. O'Neill et al., supra note 213, at 53.
311. See In re Appeal No. S-120171, 905 P.2d 555 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Reinesto v.
Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d 748 (Conn.
1992); Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d
280 (Ky. 1993); State v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Gray, 584
N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992); and Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *1 (Sup.
Ct. S.C. July 15, 1996).
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judge must exercise judicial restraint" 2 and dismiss the charge. To act
otherwise is a clear abuse of judicial discretion.313
An example of both prosecutorial and judicial overreaching can be
found in Whitner v. State.314 One of the dissenting opinions noted that
the majority reached its holding of criminal liability despite state legisla-
tive and agency action that clearly demonstrated South Carolina's crimi-
nal child neglect statute was designed to protect children once they are
born, not before.315
D. Where Is Whitner Leading the States?
The World Health Organization and the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion define substance abuse as a disease.316 In addition, the American
Medical Association states that "addiction is not simply the product of a
failure cf individual willpower. [It] is caused by complex hereditary, envi-
ronmental, and social factors." '3 1 7 Furthermore, the United States
Supreme Court has forbidden an individual to be punished based on his
status as an addict.3" 8 Finally, other public health groups and medical
organizations uniformly oppose treating pregnant substance abusers as
criminals, instead recommending education and treatment.31 9 So how
can Whitner v. State be explained?
Although states have been trying aggressively to prosecute maternal
substance abusers for the last decade or so, and property and tort law
accord the fetus more rights, Whitner likely will be viewed as an aberra-
tional decision. Whitner radically deviates from the prior holdings, and
underlying reasoning, of every other state appellate or supreme court that
has examined the issue.32 ° The constitutional issues of due process, equal
312. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 849 (6th ed. 1990) ("Judicial self-restraint" is defined
as "[s]elf-imposed discipline by judges in deciding cases without permitting themselves to
indulge their own personal views or ideas which may be inconsistent with existing deci-
sional or statutory law.").
313. Id. at 10 ("Abuse of discretion" is "[a] discretion exercised to an end or purpose
not justified by and clearly against reason and evidence. Unreasonable departure from
considered precedents and settled judicial custom, constituting error of law.").
314. Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *1 (Sup. Ct. S.C. July 15,
1996).
315. Id. at *30.
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317. Id.
318. Robinson v. State of California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (striking down a California
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protection, and particularly, the right to privacy, which the Whitner deci-
sion raises,32' will probably prevent Whitner from being used successfully
as a springboard for other state's prosecution efforts. No state has passed
a law specifically providing for criminal penalties against a woman who
uses drugs during pregnancy, in spite of the introduction of such bills in
many state legislatures. 322 Thus, Whitner likely will remain a deviation in
the law.
The long-term solution to the maternal substance abuse problem-
education and treatment-is currently not feasible due to the lack of ade-
quate facilities;323 therefore, the civil methods that the states have been
using, especially actions based on the abuse and neglect statutes, will con-
tinue to provide a short-term solution to the problem. When the state
asserts temporary custody of the born child, the needs of both mother
and child are served. In this manner, the mother can get the treatment
she needs, provided it is available, and the child is removed from a poten-
tially abusive and neglectful environment, with the ultimate goal being
family reunification where reasonable.
Whatever remedy the state uses to deal with the prenatal substance
abuser, the state should treat both illegal drugs and alcohol equally under
the law. Since both illegal and legal substances cause serious harm to the
fetus,324 to select one over the other for purposes of punishment is unjust.
The Zimmerman case may represent a shift towards equality of punish-
ment for abusers of illegal and legal substances that harm a fetus.
V. CONCLUSION
Maternal substance abuse is a public health problem, not a legal one.
As such, the pregnant women who are prenatally harming themselves and
their fetuses should be treated as patients, not criminals. As much as the
conduct of these women offends traditional notions of moral responsibil-
ity, they cannot be held criminally liable for their actions with respect to
the fetus. To do so results in placing not only the mother and her unborn
1996); Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Reyes v. Superior
Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214 (Ct. App. 1977); Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992);
State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d
280 (Ky. 1993); State v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Morabito,
580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (City Ct. 1992); and State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992). See also
supra notes 149-50, 152-56 and accompanying text.
321. Punishing, supra note 2, at 2-3.
322. Id. at 7.
323. See supra notes 23-26, 272-78 and accompanying text.
324. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 9, at 2666-667.
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child in an adversarial relationship, but also the mother and her physi-
cian, if he or she is required to report a pregnant woman's substance
abuse. '[f the woman may be held criminally liable, she either may en-
tirely avoid obtaining prenatal care, out of fear of being arrested, or may
provide inaccurate or incomplete information to her physician, thus
preventing effective treatment.325
The physician and the woman should work in concert, not at cross-
purposes, to ensure the health of both the mother and the child. As one
court stated:
[c]riminal prosecution of women for their conduct during preg-
nancy fosters neither the health of the woman nor her future
offspring; indeed, it endangers both. Criminal prosecution cru-
elly severs women from the health care system, thereby increas-
ing the potential for harm to both mother and fetus. Pregnant
women threatened by criminal prosecution have already
avoided the care of physicians and hospitals to prevent
detection.326
Due to the severe constitutional and policy concerns Whitner raises, it is
unlikely that it will lead to many future prosecutorial successes in mater-
nal substance abuse cases or trigger the creation of specific fetal abuse
statutes. If a state were ever to enact a fetal abuse law, challengers would
likely succeed on constitutional grounds.
Through Roe and its progeny, women have been accorded liberty inter-
ests and privacy rights that have allowed them to advance in society.
While many people see the Whitner holding as simply punishing a "bad"
woman for "bad" conduct that harmed her innocent, unborn child, in ac-
tuality it represents an attempt to turn the clock back on the progress
women 'have made through the right of reproductive choice. A solution is
desperat.ely needed for the maternal substance abuse problem, but the
answer is not to advance the rights of the unborn to the point where the
rights of all living, breathing women are severely jeopardized.
Carolyn Coffey
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